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ABSTRACT
When a plaintiff seeks to send notification of his Fair Labor Standards
Act claim to a collective class of potential plaintiffs, the district court
must authorize which recipients may receive this notice. Ordinarily,
the court determines that employees of the same position or under the
same employer receive collective action notice, but may a district
court authorize mailing of notice to employees proven to have signed
mandatory arbitration agreements? In Bigger v. Facebook, Inc., the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that if a defendant-employer
proves that specific employees have entered mandatory arbitration
agreements, they may not receive FLSA court notice in a collective
action claim. Moreover, the court must afford all parties the
opportunity to prove or disprove the existence and validity of these
agreements through the Seventh Circuit’s new framework mandating
an initial stage of discovery. Previously, the Seventh Circuit lacked
any formalized framework to make this determination, leaving
complete discretion over the formation of collective actions to district
courts. Without guidance, many district courts adopted a two-step
certification process that admitted a wider group into a collective
action before excluding specific opt-in plaintiffs. The Seventh Circuit
1

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law,

1

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [], Art. 3

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 16

Fall 2020

joins the Fifth Circuit in addressing the issue of whether employees
are bound by mandatory arbitration agreements at this earlier point in
litigation. This decision, however, understated how this new
framework aligns district courts with the Supreme Court’s decision
in Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Sperling and the goals of the Federal
Arbitration Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act. This article
discusses how the district courts’ role in determining the scope of
FLSA collective actions mandates this result in Bigger v. Facebook,
Inc.
INTRODUCTION
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Bigger v. Facebook, Inc.
provides guidance to district courts’ management over Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”) claims in the instances where putative
plaintiffs are employees bound by mandatory arbitration clauses with
their employer.1 Parties like employees and employers can elect to
enter contracts which mandate arbitration, foregoing claims in a
traditional court setting and consenting to submit all disputes before a
neutral third-party arbitrator.2 There are several advantages to this
route, among them cheaper and speedier resolution of disputes,3 yet
arbitration agreements remain opposed by consumer and employee
advocates. Congress lessened historical opposition to arbitration
clauses by passing the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (“FAA”),4
1

Bigger v. Facebook, Inc., 947 F.3d 1043 (7th Cir. 2020).
See JON O. SHIMABUKURO & JENNIFER A. STAMAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
R44960, MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT (2017).
3
On top of lower costs relative to litigation, arbitration often offers greater
efficiency, speed, and the ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve specialized
disputes. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685 (2010);
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 345 (2011) (“[T]he informality
of arbitral proceedings is itself desirable, reducing the cost and increasing the speed
of dispute resolution.”); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001)
(“Arbitration agreements allow parties to avoid the costs of litigation, a benefit that
may be of particular importance in employment litigation.”).
4
Arbitration infringed on the number of cases that English judges resolved,
thereby interfering with their fees-based salary. In current day, it is estimated that a
quarter of all nonunion employees are subject to mandatory arbitration agreements.
SHIMABUKURO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44960, at 1-2.
2
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providing that arbitration agreements are “valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable.”5 The Supreme Court further affirmed a “liberal policy
favoring arbitration agreements” as a way to respect the contractual
arrangement of the parties, even when balanced against statutory
protections in employment claims.6 In the context of this policy in
favor of arbitration agreements, the Seventh Circuit addressed a
question of first impression: whether a district court may authorize
court notice of an FLSA collective action to putative plaintiffs when
its recipients have entered into mutual arbitration agreements.7 The
Seventh Circuit held that despite the FLSA’s broad remedial purposes,
a district court may not send court notice to specific individuals if the
court has been shown that those employees are bound to arbitrate their
claims.8 Furthermore, Judge Michael S. Kanne, writing the unanimous
opinion for the Seventh Circuit,9 joined the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals10 in implementing a framework for district courts to permit
discovery on the validity of these arbitration agreements before
certifying a collective action.11 Addressing this matter at an earlier
stage of litigation will impact plaintiffs’ ability to reach a wider
number of employees to join the suit, but this is necessary to maintain
judicial neutrality in the court’s managerial powers over FLSA
collective actions claims.
This article will discuss why the Seventh Circuit correctly held
that district courts should not issue notice of an FLSA collective action
5

9 U.S.C. § 2.
Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 109 (holding that the FAA applies in
employment contracts and that the exemption clause should be applied narrowly to
certain classes of employment like seamen, railroad workers, and other workers
involved in foreign or interstate commerce); Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct.
1612, 1621 (2018) (holding that neither the Federal Arbitration Act’s savings clause
nor the National Labor Relations Act’s Section 7 protections of “concerted
activities” superseded the Court’s enforcement of arbitration agreements).
7
Bigger, 947 F.3d at 1047.
8
Id. at 1050.
9
Joined by Chief Judge Diane Wood and Judge (now Justice) Amy C. Barret.
10
In re JPMorgan Chase & Co., 916 F.3d 494, 502-03 (5th Cir. 2019).
11
Bigger, 947 F.3d at 1050.
6
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to individuals subject to mandatory arbitration. This holding clarifies
the parameters district court must adhere to in issuing court notice to
“potential plaintiffs,” that is, employees that are “potential
participants” in the FLSA claim.12 Moreover, the court’s framework
for determining whether individual employees are subject to valid
arbitration agreements offers guidance to district courts to make a
proper determination over which employees receive court notice while
maintaining the ultimate discretion with the district courts. This article
identifies two main purposes fulfilled by this holding and new
framework. First, the Seventh Circuit’s decision reasserts the role of
the district court as a case manager of the admission of additional
parties with a duty to only authorize “accurate and timely notice” of
FLSA claims. Second, addressing this threshold question before
certification of a collective group strikes a balance between the goals
of the FAA and the FLSA.
FACTS OF THE CASE: SUSIE BIGGER’S FLSA CLAIM AND MOTION TO
SEND COLLECTIVE ACTION NOTICE TO ALL FACEBOOK CSM LEVELS 3
AND 4 EMPLOYEES
The facts at issue are straightforward relative to the larger
procedural questions that arose before the Seventh Circuit. Susie
Bigger, a Facebook, Inc. employee in Chicago, IL, worked as a Client
Solutions Manager (“CSM”) on a sales team helping clients navigate
their purchasing options for online advertisements. The role combined
two main functions: “analytical work” to make advertising
recommendations and “upselling” clients to increase sales.13 Facebook
subdivided the CSM role into various levels depending on experience,
deeming levels 1 and 2 eligible for overtime pay while CSMs levels 3
and higher were deemed overtime-exempt.14 Bigger, a CSM level 4
employee, worked more than 40 hours weekly and brought suit in
2017 against Facebook claiming that her employer misclassified her as
12

In re JPMorgan Chase & Co., 916 F.3d at 502.
Bigger, 947 F.3d at 1047.
14
Id.
13

4
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overtime-exempt.15 Bigger alleged that Facebook’s actions violated the
FLSA and sued on behalf of all similarly situated employees, CSMs
level 3 or higher, to recover lost overtime wages.16
Bigger began her claim as the singular plaintiff. She then moved
to conditionally certify both a class and collective action, however, the
district court primarily discussed certification and notice of the latter.17
Both collective actions and class actions facilitate the resolution of
claims brought by multiple plaintiffs against the same defendant. In
the FLSA context, this permits multiple plaintiffs to proceed under the
same case to enforce their claims for unpaid wages due to a violation
of minimum wage or overtime compensation. Whereas class actions
are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, however,
collective action is authorized by the FLSA statute.18 The FLSA’s brief
statutory language providing plaintiffs the ability to proceed under
collective action has allowed district courts wide discretion in
managing claims, including judgment over the mailing of court notice
and the admittance of plaintiffs.19 Collective action further differs
from class actions in that members of a collective must opt-in to the
certified group rather than opt-out of a certified class action.20 For this
reason, court notice to potential plaintiffs is particularly important to
inform employees of the outstanding claim.
15

Id.
Id.
17
Bigger v. Facebook, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1007, 1012 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (the
proposed collective would have included “[a]ll individuals who were employed by
Facebook as Client Solutions Managers at level IC-3 or IC-4 at any location in the
United States during the period from three years” before conditional certification.)
18
29 U.S.C. § 216 (FLSA provides that “an action to recover the liability
prescribed in the preceding sentences may be maintained against any employer … by
any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other
employees similarly situated.”).
19
Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170-171 (1989).
20
Bigger, 947 F.3d at 1046, n.1; see also Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC,
705 F.3d 770, 771-72 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[I]n a collective action the members of the
class (of the “collective”) must opt into the suit to be bound by the judgment or
settlement in it, while in a class action governed by Rule 23(b)(3) (a class action
seeking damages) they must opt out not to be bound.”) (emphasis in original).
16

5
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Seeking to cast a wide net to Facebook employees and garner
interest for individuals to opt-in to her FLSA claim, Bigger argued that
the district court should authorize court notice to all CSMs levels 3
and higher. Facebook opposed Bigger’s proposed collective and
argued against the district court permitting a court notice to be sent to
all CSMs levels 3 and higher. Facebook argued that because most of
the intended recipients agreed to individually arbitrate their legal
disputes and waived their legal right to seek redress in court, they were
not potential plaintiffs eligible to join Bigger’s claim.21
Despite Facebook’s arguments, the district court agreed with
Bigger to conditionally certify her proposed collective action. The
Seventh Circuit lacked an official standard for determining how
district courts should proceed when a plaintiff moves to certify a
collective. Most district courts, therefore, adopted a two-step test
utilized by other Court of Appeals, as was the case here.22 In the first
step, “conditional certification,” the plaintiff proceeding in an FLSA
claim had a low burden of proof in arguing that she and similarly
situated employees were “victims of a common policy” in violation of
the law.23 The district court then facilitated mailing of court notice and
admission of interested plaintiffs. Following completion of discovery
on all substantive issues, the district court applied a stricter standard
and reevaluated whether the named plaintiff and opt-in plaintiffs were
indeed similarly situated to proceed as a collective to trial. 24
The district court noted the tension between the liberal
enforcement of arbitration clauses under the FAA and the plaintiff’s
requirement to allege a “modest factual showing” in an FLSA
collective action claim.25 However, operating under this two-step
certification process, it ruled that the enforcement of arbitration
agreements between Facebook and third parties was premature and
21

Bigger, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1021-22.
Id. at 1021.
23
See William B. Rubenstein, 7 Newberg on Class Actions § 23:37 (5th ed.
2020).
24
Id.; see also Bigger, 947 F.3d at 1049, n.5.
25
Bigger, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1022.
22

6
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conditionally certified Bigger’s collective because she had met her
burden that the putative plaintiffs were all victims of a common
policy.26 The district court effectively decided to permit notice to a
larger group of potential plaintiffs, allow a broad group to enter the
claim and determine which plaintiffs were indeed similarly situated at
the second stage. Opposing this wait-and-see approach, Facebook
sought and was granted interlocutory appeal of the district court’s
certification.
SEVENTH CIRCUIT HELD THAT DISTRICT COURTS MAY NOT AUTHORIZE
FLSA COLLECTIVE ACTION NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES BOUND BY
ARBITRATION AND EMPLOYERS MUST BE GIVEN OPPORTUNITY TO
PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF A VALID ARBITRATION AGREEMENT FOR
SPECIFIC EMPLOYEES.
On appeal, Facebook argued that most employees would have
improperly received notice of Bigger’s FLSA claim because they
waived their right to join class and collective actions.27 Instead, these
employees agreed to arbitrate their claims, but, Bigger was not bound
by a similar arbitration agreement, thereby distinguishing Bigger
because she could proceed in a suit before the district court.28
According to Facebook, the notice would misinform a majority of its
recipients about their ability to join Bigger’s FLSA claim while
simultaneously inflating Bigger’s leverage in settlement power.29 In
contrast, Bigger overlooked the matter of arbitration and focused on
the substantive questions that united her with the larger proposed
collective because they were “victims of a common policy” that
misclassified CSMs as overtime-exempt employees in violation of the
FLSA.30 According to Bigger, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by authorizing notice to a larger group of putative plaintiffs
26

Id. at 1022-24.
Bigger, 947 F.3d at 1048.
28
Id. at 1048-49.
29
Id. at 1049.
30
Id.
27

7
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because the court could admit these employees as plaintiffs and then
remove them if the defendant motioned to decertify the class or
compel arbitration.31 Bigger argued that the district court correctly
relied on the two-step certification process and that its discretion in
managing its docket of cases permitted the broad authorization of
court notice, regardless of the putative employees’ arbitration
obligations.
The Seventh Circuit arrived at its decision by weighing the twin
goals of the FLSA, enforcement and efficiency, against its dangers. It
first noted that the FLSA permits collective action as a means of
practically enforcing the rights of plaintiffs by permitting employees
to pool resources when seeking redress would be otherwise deterred
by the costs of legal representation.32 The Seventh Circuit then
explained that the practice of sending notice to a larger group of
putative plaintiffs and then weeding out ineligible participants might
generally favor the efficient resolution of a greater number of claims.33
In this specific situation, however, the court would have delayed
litigation by providing individuals subject to mandatory arbitration
agreements the futile opportunity to join the collective action.
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit weighed these goals against the
court’s obligations to maintain judicial neutrality. By granting
authorization of collective action notice to a larger group of putative
plaintiffs, the district court approached an implicit endorsement of
Bigger’s claim in the eyes of the putative plaintiffs. The decision also
recognized one of Facebook’s arguments that broad distribution of
collective action notice would artificially inflate the plaintiff’s
settlement leverage.34
Taking all these values into consideration, the Seventh Circuit
held that a “court may not authorize notice to individuals whom the
court has been shown entered mutual arbitration agreements, waiving
31

Id.
Id.
33
Id. at 1050.
34
Id; see also Brief and Short Appendix of Appellant, at 16-17, Bigger v.
Facebook, Inc., 947 F.3d 1043 (7th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-1944).
32

8
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their right to join the action.”35 Moreover, the defendant must be
offered an opportunity to prove the existence of such arbitration
agreements. The prior two-step certification process did not afford
defendant-employers the opportunity to contest mailing of court notice
to specific employees while simultaneously holding plaintiffs to a low
burden at the conditional certification stage. Therefore, the Seventh
Circuit issued a new framework for district courts managing FLSA
claims to determine whether the defendant-employer can exclude
specific employees from receiving court notice.36 First, the court must
determine whether the plaintiff contests the existence of valid
arbitration agreements entered into by members of the proposed
collective.37 In most cases, plaintiffs will contest the validity of these
arbitration agreements.38 “[I]f a plaintiff contests the defendant’s
assertions, then – before authorizing notice to the alleged “arbitration
employees” – the court must permit the parties to submit additional
evidence on the agreements’ existence and validity.”39 Following
discovery, the court may determine whether the employer has met its
burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence
of a valid arbitration agreement for each employee it seeks to exclude
from receiving notice.40 The court may then authorize notice to any
employee not bound by a mutual arbitration agreement.41
The Seventh Circuit emphasized that the courts do not take the
employer’s word at face value.42 In the instant case, for example,
Facebook originally introduced templates of the mutual arbitration
agreements that over half of the proposed collective members
35

Id.
Id.
37
Id.
38
This was not the case in JPMorgan Chase & Co., 916 F.3d 494 (5th Cir.
2019).
39
Bigger, 947 F.3d at 1050.
40
Id.
41
Id. (“[I]f the employer does not prove that an employee entered a valid
arbitration agreement, then the court may authorize notice to that employee—
granted, of course, that the employee is otherwise an appropriate notice recipient.”).
42
Id. at 1051.
36

9
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allegedly entered into.43 This sample agreement would not suffice to
prove the validity and existence of an arbitration agreement binding
individual employees because the employer carries the burden to
prove which specific employees are bound by its terms.44 Moreover,
the Seventh Circuit emphasized that judges are authorized to resolve
the threshold question of whether the parties are bound by a valid
arbitration agreement without interfering with the general policy
favoring arbitration in the FAA.45
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S NEW FRAMEWORK ENSURES THAT DISTRICT
COURTS STILL HAVE DISCRETION OVER FLSA COLLECTIVE ACTIONS
WHILE ENSURING ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION
The Seventh Circuit correctly ruled that district courts cannot
authorize court notice of collective action claims to individuals bound
by arbitration agreements. Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit’s
framework provides an opportunity for defendant-employers to contest
mailing of opt-in notices to arbitration-bound employees before
certifying the collective. In effect, district court judges maintain their
discretion over the admission of similarly situated individuals,
however, the Seventh Circuit’s new procedure ensures that only
plaintiffs that can opt into the suit receive notice. By resolving this
threshold question at the beginning of litigation, the Bigger framework
fulfills two purposes. First, the Seventh Circuit’s decision reaffirms
that the district court judge must be involved early in litigation to
provide putative plaintiffs accurate and timely notice of the FLSA
claim. Second, addressing the threshold question of the existence and
validity of arbitration agreements at an earlier stage of litigation strikes
a balance between the goals of the FAA and the FLSA.
43

Id. at 1048.
Id. at 1051 (The Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the district court with
instructions to apply the new framework and allow additional discovery on the
specific employees bound by arbitration agreements before Facebook could exclude
specific employees from receiving court notice.)
45
Id.
44

10
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Under the Seventh Circuit’s New Framework, District Courts Become
Involved Early to Resolve the Scope of Court Notice in FLSA
Collective Action
First, the Seventh Circuit’s new framework aligns the district
courts’ procedure for authorizing court notice in FLSA claims with the
Supreme Court’s holding that district courts only provide “accurate
and timely” notice to putative plaintiffs in collective actions.46 In
Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, the Supreme Court held that the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act’s (“ADEA”) authorization of
collective action grants the district court the necessary managerial
authority to oversee the joining of multiple parties.47 The Court
justified the district court’s involvement in collective action litigation
to curtail against the potential abuse of the multiple-party device,
much like how a district court judge oversees the contours of a class
action claim under F.R.C.P. Rule 23.48 This broad authority, however,
must only be exercised in a manner that ensures efficient resolution of
claims and accurate information to parties entering the suit.49 Since the
ADEA incorporates its collective action authorization from the FLSA
statute,50 these duties apply in equal force to collective action claims
arising from a plaintiff’s allegations under the FLSA. The Seventh
Circuit’s holding in Bigger clarifies one way in which district courts
should guard against potential abuse of the collective action devise by
ensuring that recipients of court notices receive accurate information
about their eligibility to join an FLSA claim.
46

Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 493 U.S. at 170 (holding that the district court
judge must be involved at an early period in ADEA collective actions claims to
ensure that any communication sent to potential plaintiffs accurately informs
potential plaintiffs of the claim before the court).
47
Id.
48
Id. at 170-71.
49
Id.
50
Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1102 (10th Cir. 2001)
(Class actions under the ADEA are authorized by 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), which
expressly borrows the opt-in class action mechanism of the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1994)).

11
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Under the prior two-step certification process, district courts did
not scrutinize the scope of a collective or which employees received
official court notice of a plaintiff’s FLSA claim.51 Rather, district
courts approved most plaintiffs’ proposed collectives so long as the
plaintiff met the low burden of alleging that employees were victims
of a similar policy.52 The district courts’ broad authorization, however,
incorrectly granted plaintiffs permission to act like the sower in the
biblical parable, who scattered his seed widely hoping that it will fall
on good soil.53 This was the approach adopted by Bigger on appeal.
Bigger emphasized that the first step of conditional certification only
required the plaintiff to demonstrate a “modest factual showing” and
that the court should not decide the matter of whether employees
signed a mandatory arbitration agreement at that point in litigation.54
Bigger then went beyond this lenient standard and argued that the
district court does not “decide substantive issues or require conclusive
support of plaintiffs’ claims.”55 Courts, however, should check
plaintiffs like Bigger seeking to send court notice to employees that
are likely restricted by mandatory arbitration agreements to prevent
plaintiffs from throwing everything at the wall to see what sticks. Even
if employees and proposed recipients of court notice might share
substantive facts that prove or disprove the alleged FLSA violation,
not all employees may seek relief in federal court.56 If the district court
51

FLSA’s collective action provision does not define “potential plaintiffs,” nor
does it provide for a specific methodology of determining which recipients may
receive court notice to opt-in to FLSA claims. For these reasons, many courts,
including several district courts within the Seventh Circuit, have coalesced around
this two-step process. See WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, 7 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS
§ 23:37 (5th ed. 2020).
52
Bigger, 947 F.3d at 1049, n.5.
53
Matthew 13:1-23.
54
Plaintiff-Appellee’s Brief at 16-17, Bigger v. Facebook, Inc., 947 F.3d 1043
(7th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-1944).
55
Id. at 17.
56
Alvarez v. City of Chicago, 605 F.3d 445, 449, n.1 (7th Cir. 2010) (“There
may also be cases where despite common questions as to liability, the remedy is so
tailored to each particular plaintiff that a collective action is inappropriate.”).

12
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adopted a lenient standard in every instance of certifying a collective,
it would defer its careful exercise of managerial responsibility to the
plaintiff. Moreover, the court would compromise its role in providing
accurate information to putative plaintiffs because individuals with
valid arbitration agreements may be misled into believing they may
join the plaintiff’s claim. Since the court notice bears the weight and
name of the district court, an individual receiving it might confuse it
with the court’s solicitation for claims rather than the named
plaintiff’s.57
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit’s new framework reasserts the
district court’s active role in shaping the contours of a collective
action, in part by mandating a scrupulous analysis of which recipients
should be notified of the pending suit. The Seventh Circuit effectively
defined which recipients are “potential employees” eligible to receive
opt-in notice, or at the very least, excluded those bound by arbitration
agreements from its definition. District courts have always made this
determination at the second stage of the two-step process by enforcing
defendants’ motions to decertify a class or to exclude plaintiffs.58 The
framework set forth in Bigger, therefore, does not detract from the
managerial authority district courts already exercised over FLSA
collective actions. Rather, it guides district courts through a stage of
discovery to determine the proper scope of its court notice that a
plaintiff may utilize to reach potential plaintiffs, that is, those
employees that may join the claim.
Adhering to this preliminary step supports the district courts’ duty
to ensure that any official court communication be timely, accurate,
57

Bigger, 947 F.3d at 1049.
Mickles on behalf of herself v. Country Club Inc., 887 F.3d 1270, 1276
(11th Cir. 2018) (“The second stage is precipitated by a motion for decertification
from the defendant, which is typically filed after discovery is complete and the
matter is ready for trial. At this stage, the court has more information and makes a
factual determination of the similarly-situated question. If the claimants are similarly
situated, the district court allows the representative action to proceed to trial. If they
are not similarly situated, the district court decertifies the class, and the opt-in
plaintiffs are dismissed without prejudice.) (citations and internal quotations
omitted).
58

13
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and informative. Since the employer-defendant holds relevant
information on its own obligations to uphold arbitration agreements,
district courts can expediently enforce arbitration by placing the
burden on the defendant-employer to produce proof of the existence
and validity of each agreement. 59 Doing so increases the likelihood
that the court reaches an accurate audience and reduces the harm of an
artificially inflated collective group. Alternative methods may
accomplish some, but not all, of these goals. For example, adding a
disclaimer to the court notice to the effect of “Individual employees
bound to an arbitration agreement may not be eligible to join” may
increase the accuracy of a court’s notification to potential plaintiffs,
but it overlooks the efficiency of placing the burden on the defendantemployer to provide evidence of specific arbitration agreements at the
onset of litigation. District courts still hold discretion in managing
their docket and defining the scope of the collective, but this
framework provides procedures to guard against the risks associated
with an unchecked collective group that the prior certification process
permitted.
Providing the Parties the Opportunity to Prove or Disprove the
Existence of Arbitration Agreements Balances the Competing Goals of
the FAA and FLSA.
Second, the Seventh Circuit’s new framework fulfills the
secondary purpose of balancing the goals of two broadly interpreted
statutes, the FAA and the FLSA. The new procedure guides district
court judges in respecting the contractual agreements that arbitrationbound employees have agreed to while addressing the remedial
concerns of plaintiffs bringing claims under the FLSA.
Congress pronounced a strong favoritism for implementing
mandatory arbitration agreements when it codified that courts should
enforce parties’ agreed-to arbitration terms as “valid, irrevocable, and
59

Bigger, 947 F.3d at 1050 (“The employer seeking to exclude employees
from receiving notice has the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
the existence of a valid arbitration agreement for each employee it seeks to exclude
from receiving notice.”).
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enforceable.”60 In the employment context, the Supreme Court
furthered this broad policy of the FAA by affirmatively declaring
mandatory arbitration clauses enforceable in employment contracts.61
Even statutory language like the FAA’s savings clause, which permits
arbitration agreements to be declared invalid because of common law
contract defenses, has been limited by the Court to apply only to
generally applicable defenses and not on the individual merits of a
particular agreement.62 District courts may require parties to prove the
existence and validity of arbitration agreements with specific
information as to which parties are bound, the specific terms in the
agreement, and generally resolving the gateway question of whether
an agreement is valid. 63 Courts, however, must resolve any doubts
concerning the scope of these contractual agreements in favor of
arbitration.64
Bigger appropriately raised her concerns that Facebook had not
sufficiently proved the existence of its arbitration agreements with
CSMs levels 3 and higher before the district court. At the time of this
appeal, Facebook had only submitted into evidence two templates of
arbitration agreements that “336 of the 428 CSMs employed at IC 3
and 4” entered into and were allegedly prevented them from joining

60

9 U.S.C. § 2.
Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 119 (narrowly constructing the FAA’s
exemption clause in §1, prohibiting the use of arbitration clauses only in
employment contracts of transportation workers, but affirming that arbitration
clauses may be enforced generally in other employment contracts).
62
AT&T Mobility LLC, 563 U.S. at 339-43 (FAA preempts any state law or
rule that outright prohibits the enforcement of arbitration clauses, and, moreover, the
FAA’s savings clause does not preserve said state laws, or in this case, California
judicial rule prohibiting arbitration clauses in instances of duress, because the state
court inherently makes a substantive determination of the merits of the arbitration
agreement).
63
Bigger, 947 F.3d at 1050-51 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)); see also Lamps Plus, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1416
(affirming a default assumption that district courts resolve “gateway” questions as to
the validity of arbitration agreements).
64
Bigger, 947 F.3d at 1051.
61

15

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law,

15

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [], Art. 3

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 16

Fall 2020

Bigger’s claim.65 As Chief Judge Wood pointed out in oral argument,
however, these templates failed to demonstrate which specific
individuals were bound to its terms and whether the agreements varied
in scope for particular employees.66 On this basis, Bigger argued for
delaying the determination of the validity of these proposed arbitration
agreements until after conditional certification and mailing of court
notice. This lines up with the approach of the prior two-step
certification process because the burden was placed solely on the
plaintiff-employee to allege a relationship to the putative plaintiffs.
From this perspective, notice by itself does not go against the validity
of mandatory arbitration agreements because employees do not violate
the terms of their contractual obligations with Facebook until they
decide to opt into Bigger’s claim. But this procedure fails to account
for the other half of the arbitration agreement, namely, offering
Facebook an opportunity to enforce its contractual rights under the
FAA.67
Permitting the defendant-employer an opportunity to enforce the
arbitration clauses it has signed aligns the district court with the
federal policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements. By
shifting the burden onto defendant-employers, the district court
maximizes the efficiency of resolving jurisdictional questions of
whether certain plaintiffs can proceed in federal court by having one
party to the signed agreements responsible for asserting the contractual
right. Furthermore, this change asserts the district court’s gatekeeping
authority to resolve matters of the existence and validity of arbitration
agreements under the FAA.68 Within the larger scope of a district
court’s managerial responsibility for defining collective action claims,
the Seventh Circuit’s new framework provides the procedural steps a
65

Id. at 1048, n.3.
Oral Argument at 6:20, Bigger v. Facebook, Inc., 947 F.3d 1043 (2020) (No.
19-1944), http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2019/pr.19-1944.191944_09_27_2019.mp3.
67
MARTIN DOMKE, GABRIEL WILNER & LARRY E. EDMONSON, 1 DOMKE ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 21:1 (2020) (The party to the arbitration agreement
holds the contractual right to compel arbitration.).
68
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452 (2003).
66
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district court must follow to resolve substantive matters of which
plaintiffs are indeed similarly situated to proceed at the district court
level, and which plaintiffs must arbitrate their claims. 69
Conversely, the Seventh Circuit had to balance enforcement of the
FLSA and its remedial purposes to redress employee claims of wage
and hour violations.70 The opinion took stock of the statute’s two
goals, efficiency and enforcement, in arriving to its conclusion.71 The
Seventh Circuit determined the court’s commitment to judicial
neutrality ultimately outweighed the benefits that derived from the
FLSA’s goals, but this conclusion understated how the new framework
enhances the purposes of the FLSA. While the Seventh Circuit arrived
at the correct conclusion that employees proven to be bound by
arbitration cannot receive notice of the FLSA collective action claim,
the decision did not expand on the legal distinctions between Bigger
and the CSMs that signed arbitration agreements. Their function and
role within the corporation share similar substantive questions,
however, their rights to seek a legal claim differed widely.
The goal of efficiency under the FLSA statute commits the district
court to resolving in a single action issues arising from the same
alleged violation.72 As stated above, the Seventh Circuit concluded
that this goal neither favored nor disfavored authorizing a larger scope
of court notice, but it offered some reasons for both. The Seventh
Circuit reasoned that casting a wider net of putative plaintiffs only to
later remove ineligible arbitration-bound employees could efficiently
69

First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (Courts
should apply state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts when
deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate disputes.).
70
Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 206 (2d Cir. 2015)
(the Supreme Court has interpreted the [FLSA] liberally and afforded its protections
broad coverage).
71
Bigger, 947 F.3d at 1049.
72
See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“An action to recover … may be maintained against
any employer … by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or
themselves and other employees similarly situated.”); see also Hoffmann-La Roche
Inc., 493 U.S. at 170 (“The judicial system benefits by efficient resolution in one
proceeding of common issues of law and fact arising from the same alleged
discriminatory activity.”).
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resolve a higher number of disputes.73 On the other hand, in the
specific situation where the defendant has demonstrated that certain
individuals cannot join the FLSA collective action, it would be
inefficient to send notice to them.74 Between the two alternatives,
however, the district court follows a speedier resolution of claims
when it separates individual employees that have no opportunity to
enter the claim. If court notice of an FLSA collective action were to be
sent widely to individuals bound to arbitration, some partial amount of
this group may be misled into seeking relief by opting into the claim
rather than initiating their own arbitration claim. Under the prior twostep process, the admittance of these arbitration-bound employees
would be unchecked until the second stage of the certification process.
Facebook, the defendant-employer contesting the admittance of certain
employees, would have to stagger its motions to compel arbitration for
each employee that mistakenly opted into the claim; in turn, the
district court would have to rule on each individual motion. This delay
runs counter to the district courts’ duty to administer proceedings in a
way to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action.”75 Conversely, the Seventh Circuit’s framework saves the
parties’ and the court’s efforts because it condenses multiple motions
to compel arbitration into one step. By resolving the matter of
determining which employees were bound by arbitration earlier in
litigation, district courts can more efficiently resolve the substantive
matters of whether FLSA plaintiffs can proceed under the same claim.
The second FLSA goal, enforcement, directs the district court to
authorize multiple-plaintiff suits so that employees may pool resources
when seeking to redress violations of overtime-pay requirements.
Specifically, the FLSA statutory language permits collective action of
73

Bigger, 947 F.3d at 1050 (“[I]t may be efficient to first send notice to a
group of people and then weed out those who opt in but are in fact ineligible to
join.”).
74
Id. (“[T]he notice may serve only to prompt futile attempts at joinder or the
assertion of claims outside the collective proceeding.”).
75
Fed. R. Civ. P. 1; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 83 (“A judge may regulate practice
in any manner consistent with federal law, rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072
and 2075, and the district's local rules.”).

18

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol16/iss1/3

18

Martinez: Facebook Message Not Delivered: Employers May Challenge Authoriza

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 16

Fall 2020

“similarly situated” employees to join a claim against their employer.76
The FLSA’s remedial goals might lend support for a broader
interpretation of which employees are “similarly situated,” but the
district court must respect the outer limits of its discretion. The
Seventh Circuit’s holding and framework clarifies these boundaries by
guiding district courts to only authorize notice to putative plaintiffs
that still hold the legal right to enter the claim and uphold judicial
neutrality in its decision.
The key difference distinguishing Bigger and CSMs levels 3 and
4 that are bound by arbitration clauses is that only Bigger held the
legal right to proceed in her FLSA claim before the federal district
court. If an employee is proven to have consented to arbitrate claims
outside of court in their employment contract, and he opts into
Bigger’s claim, the court cannot permit the individual to proceed in
court, but rather, the court must compel arbitration of that individual
employee’s claim.77 Moreover, employees may share common
substantive questions, such as the number of hours worked and the
type of work performed, yet require different proceedings to advance
their claims because the remedy available to one may not be available
to the other.78 Without a doubt, Bigger’s FLSA claim that her role as a
CSM should have been eligible for overtime shared many of the same
substantive questions as all CSM levels 3 and 4; the resolution of
Bigger’s collective action might prove helpful in the individual
arbitration outcomes of other CSMs. All the same, the district court
must recognize that it cannot enforce a claim where the employee has
consented to submit all claims before a third-party arbitrator, thereby
waiving a legal right to pursue a resolution in federal district court.79

76

29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
Bigger, 947 F.3d at 1050.
78
Alvarez v. City of Chicago, 605 F.3d at 449, n.1 (7th Cir. 2010) (“There may
also be cases where despite common questions as to liability, the remedy is so
tailored to each particular plaintiff that a collective action is inappropriate.”).
79
Hoffmann-La Roche Inc, 493 U.S. at 170-71 (“[A]ffirmative permission for
employees to proceed on behalf of those similarly situated must grant the court the
requisite procedural authority to manage the process of joining multiple parties in a
77
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Put another way, the district court could not authorize court notice to
all CSMs levels 3 and 4 because it could not grant employees more
legal rights and enforce an authorization of court notice to individuals
that were not similarly situated to Bigger. As such, the legal
distinctions between Bigger and arbitration-bound employees makes
the Seventh Circuit’s framework fall in line with the goal of
“enforcement.”
In all, the Seventh Circuit’s new framework correctly resolves this
conflict between the FAA and the FLSA. By providing a procedure
that permits both plaintiff-employees and defendant-employers the
opportunity to introduce evidence on the existence and validity of
specific arbitration agreements, the Seventh Circuit streamlines the
admittance of potential plaintiff-employees. Moreover, addressing the
threshold question of whether particular arbitration agreements are
valid and enforceable prior to mailing of court notices mitigates the
risk of misinforming employees that are mandated to arbitrate their
employment claims from opting into the collective action. By taking
steps to ensure that the district court’s authorization of court notice
addresses which employees waived their legal right to enter the claim,
the Seventh Circuit directs district courts to become involved early in
determining the scope of the authorization for collective action notice.
In all, the Seventh Circuit’s framework maximizes the benefits of the
prior two-step certification process in that district courts still hold
discretion in defining the collective while enacting safeguards against
unchecked propagation of court notice.

manner that is orderly, sensible, and not otherwise contrary to statutory commands
or the provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
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